Introduction
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Negroes in New York faced many difficulties building businesses. The post-Civil War riots and other social upheavals caused black businesses to lose considerable white patronage (Ottley and Weatherby 1967) . Attempts were made to encourage black business 1 but it remained hard for Negro entrepreneurs to raise adequate capital because banks and other financial institutions were predominantly white owned. Therefore, black businesses were typically smallscale service sector activities such as dressmaking, poolrooms, grocery stores, restaurants and barbershops. At the same time, more and more blacks migrated from the southern states of the United States in order to obtain employment in northern cities. With this mass migration, a new musical and cultural heritage spread across the nation. In uptown New York (Harlem), there was a buoyant nightlife but the black musicians engaged in it were relatively unknown and, with one or two exceptions, neither they nor their new music style were recorded by the major record companies of the time 2 . Thus jazz music, which was seen by some as a 'dangerous' type of music anyway, had little overall impact prior to 1920. In fact, Negro musicians were so little known that the first jazz recording ever made was in 1917 by a white band called the Original Dixieland Jass (sic) Band (Cook and Morton 1996) .
In response to the lack of opportunity for black musicians in the recording industry, Harry Herbert Pace formed his own recording company, the Pace Phonograph Corporation, Inc., in 1920. This company founded and operated the influential Black Swan label. Black Swan became the most successful Negro-owned business of the early 1920s, even though it was started during an economic recession.
Pace explicitly used the race issue in promoting his records, saying that:
Every time you buy a Black Swan record, you buy the only record made by colored people. (New York Age, January 21 1922, p. 6) He signed top black artists such as Ethel Waters and Fletcher Henderson to the label, although he declined others such as Bessie Smith. In 1921 and 1922 Pace organized a vaudeville tour across the United States by his most famous musicians. This established the company firmly on the recording map. The company earned $104,628 during its first eleven months of operation (New York Age, January 28 1922). However, it fell into decline soon after, due partly to poor investment decisions. Partnerships were entered into with white people's businesses which, since Pace had earlier exploited the race issue, eventually worked against the Black Swan label an d the company. The major record companies entered the niche market, first exploited by Pace, as well, and this competition also had a severe adverse effect on his business. The end of Pace's company came in May 1924 when Paramount announced it was leasing the Black Swan catalogue, thus making the Pace Phonograph Corporation's main asset worthless.
The remainder of this paper analyzes the rise and fall of the Black Swan label using both cultural and economic elements. Management accounting theory is applied to examine the company's financial statements and investment decisions. A summary will highlight our most important findings.
The Foundation and Growth of Black Swan
Harry Herbert Pace was born in 1884 in Covington, Georgia. He taught Greek and Latin before holding various junior executive positions with banks and insurance companies in Atlanta and Memphis. In this stage of his career, Pace made a name for himself as a rebuilder of failing enterprises (Weusi 1996) and, despite being black, gained valuable experience in obtaining and handling capital. In 1907 (Allen 1973) (Allen 1973) . The Pace Phonograph Corporation's initial capital stock was $30,000 (Ottley and Weatherby 1967) . The company was incorporated under Delaware law and Pace borrowed about $110,000 to get the company started (Weusi 1996) 5 .
Black Swan, the name for the company's record label, was chosen to honour Elizabeth Taylor Greenfield (1809-1876), a talented black singer who was known by that name. Weusi (1996) calls Black Swan the first Negro-owned recording company, but Allen (1973) Pace said about the emergence of his own phonograph corporation:
The organization was an outgrow of my observation as President of the Pace and Handy Company … that phonograph companies were not recording the voices of Negro singers and musicians. … I ran up against a color line that was very severe. … I therefore determined to form my own company and make recordings as I believed would sell. (Ottley and Weatherby 1967, p. 232) Given that 1921 was a recession year, Pace probably had a hard time getting his company on the road. Among his difficulties was the problem of finding a plant that would actually press his records. Weusi (1996) says that when Pace wanted to use a local pressing company "a large white company purchased the plant to keep him out". No other source mentions this problem and Pace himself did not address this issue in his own recollections, stating only that many other companies:
… refused to press records for outsiders and I finally learned of the New York Recording Laboratory located in Port Washington, Wisconsin, who was willing to press the records for me if I would have them recorded and furnish them a complete master. (Ottley and Weatherby 1967, pp. 232-233) Despite the travel required between Port Washington and New York every time a record was to be pressed, a manufacturing agreement was soon made. The New York Recording Laboratory was owned by Paramount. The Paramount label was started in January 1915 but, by the time of the 1921 recession, Black Swan remained as Paramount's only customer (Calt 1988) .
In May 1921 the first three records on the Black Swan label (with label numbers 2001, 2002, and 2003) were released. Fletcher Henderson, who played piano on these dates, as he did on virtually all Black Swan records until at least the fall of 1921, acknowledged that these first records had little to do with jazz. That changed when the company signed Ethel Waters. Accounts of who discovered Waters differ , but the Black Swan label really rose to fame after she joined it. She had recorded before, for Cardinal, yet somehow hit a purple patch when she came to Black Swan. Although primarily regarded as a blues singer, Gavin Bushell, who was the clarinettist on many of the later Black Swan recordings, saw her as a jazz singer:
Ethel was a jazz singer. She didn't sing real blues … she syncopated …. Fletcher didn't write out anything for Ethel's record dates. You didn't have written music to back singers in those days. … We'd spend the greater part of the day making two numbers. (Hentoff and McCarthy 1959, p. 41) Waters' first sides for the company were 'Down Home Blues' and 'Oh Daddy'. They were released as Black Swan 2010. Allen (1973) thinks that during the first couple of months after their release, about 118,000 copies of the record were sold. In his own recollections, Pace even names a figure of 500,000 sold copies within the first six months (Ottley and Weatherby 1967 (Weusi 1996) . Alas, it never would be.
Following the success of 'Down Home Blues', the company continued to expand, with staff numbers growing to 15-30 people. Meanwhile, Pace sent Ethel Waters and some of Black Swan's other popular artists on a vaudeville tour across the United States. Although such tours were generally not as common or successful as they once were (Allen 1973) , it turned out to be a great move. The tour lasted from late October 1921 until early July 1922. The band backing Waters was led by Fletcher Henderson and was named by newspapers with such fanciful labels as the 'Black Swan Dance Orchestra', the 'Black Swan Jazzmen', the 'Black Swan Troubadours', the 'Black Swan Jazz Masters' and the 'Black Swan Jazz Boys'. In total, 21 states and 53 cities were visited (Weusi 1996) , and huge crowds came out to see Ethel Waters and her Black Swan Jazzmen. Highlights included an April 1922 concert being broadcast in five states as well as in Mexico (which made Ethel Waters the first black woman to sing on radio), and the gigs played in Richmond, Virginia to an audience of more than 4000 in June 1922 (Allen 1973 ).
The company's expansion accelerated due to the effects of the vaudeville tour. In addition, with Fletcher Henderson being on tour with Ethel Waters, William Still Grant (Henderson's boss) had taken over arranging duties. Grant expanded Black Swan's repertoire to include all genres of music including operas and symphonic works, which led to additional orders. The expansion also led to the opening of overseas offices of Black Swan, in such 'outskirts' as the Philippines and the West Indies among others. To further accommodate the expansion, Pace bought a house at 2289 Seventh Avenue on 135 th Street, moving the company's offices into the two upper floors and using the street floor as a shipping room. Pace then started looking for another pressing plant because he became impatient with the delay in extra orders coming from the Port Washington plant. Premises were found in Long Island City that had a recording room, plating outfit, and pressing room, and the entire company was moved there in April 1922.
According to Pace, in those days he was selling:
… 7,000 records a day and had only three presses in the [Long Island City] factory which could make 6,000 records daily, so that we were running behind. (Ottley and Weatherby 1967, p. 234) Pace went into partnership with a white man called John Fletcher to purchase the Long Island City plant. Fletcher had been an executive officer with the Olympic Disc Record Corporation, a subsidiary of the Remington Phonograph Corporation. Fletcher's duties included managing the recording studio at the Long Island City plant. When the Remington Phonograph Corporation failed in December 1921, Fletcher purchased Olympic's trademark, masters, and facilities (Rust 1978) . After forming his partnership with Harry Pace, Fletcher oversaw the production side of Black Swan records, while Pace and his staff continued to determine artists and repertoire.
The Dying Swan
Because Pace had used the race issue to promote his records, many African-Americans, especially from the entertainment industry, believed that Pace, by working so closely with John Fletcher, a non-black, had broken his promise to build an all-Negro recording company. They therefore deliberately neglected Black Swan and refused to make records for the label (Weusi 1996) . Furthermore, Ethel Waters and Fletcher Henderson, two of Black Swan's biggest names, stopped recording exclusively for the label in mid-1922. In addition, larger record companies, such as Columbia, Victor and OKeh, seeing Black Swan's success, began imitating its principles by making more and more recordings featuring black musicians playing in their own style. These big companies were better equipped to reach a mass market more quickly than Black Swan (which despite its early success and growth, was still basically a start-up company) and began pushing Black Swan out of what had been its exclusive market.
When the company went into decline, in a desperate attempt to recapture market share, Black Swan issued a growing number of records by white musicians, implying that they were recorded by Negroes and altering recording details along the way. When this became known, the label's reputation suffered even more damage 9 .
Black Swan's troubles were compounded following the purchase of three new pressing machines to cope with the increasing demand for its records in mid-1922. By the time the machines were set up and ready to start pressing in early 1923, radio broadcasting was coming to the fore and record dealers began cancelling orders and returning records already delivered (Weusi 1996) . Worsening general economic conditions exacerbated Black Swan's problems. Pace found his company:
… making and selling only 3,000 records daily and then it came down to 1,000, and our factory was closed for two weeks at a time, and finally the factory was sold at a sheriff's sale and was bought by a Chicago firm who made records for Sears & Roebuck Company. However, this did not completely defeat us and we continued to have records made at a concern in Connecticut and sold these repeat orders for a year or so until the thing finally came to a close. (Ottley and Weatherby 1967, pp. 234-235) In March 1923 the Pace Phonograph Corporation changed its name to the Black Swan Phonograph Corporation. A 1923 trade directory lists the (presumably final) Pace 9 As we already indicated, John Fletcher had been a senior executive with the Olympic Disc Record Corporation and had obtained all of its material, which was primarily recorded by white musicians. Fletcher reissued some of this material on the Black Swan label as new material by Negro musicians (Allen 1973) . Weusi (1996) names the records by the Original Memphis Five as an example. Another example is found at http://www.mainspringpress.com/blkswan.htm, where we see that a performer named Lorenzo Wells on Black Swan records was in fact Charles Hart, a popular white tenor. Thygesen, Berresford and Shor (1996) fully cross-reference Black Swan records with those from other labels.
Phonograph Corporation group of officers as: Harry H. Pace, president and general manager; J.P. Quander (who may have succeeded Daniel F. Haynes) secretary; and V.L. Bibb, treasurer (Allen 1973 (Thygesen, Berresford and Shor 1996) .
Management Accounting Issues
The Black Swan case raises several interesting management accounting issues. Firstly, it raises the question how Black Swan set up its financial statements, what accounting standards were used, and how this compares with the practice of other (particularly record) companies of the time.
Secondly, a typical investment decision problem underlies the purchase of the three pressing machines in 1922. If the radio broadcasting explosion of 1923 was a major factor in the company's decline, and if it could have been anticipated, was it really such a wise decision to go ahead buying these machines, predominantly as Pace and Fletcher must have been aware they were doing things that could seriously damage Black Swan's reputation? Were Pace and Fletcher perhaps blinded by their own success, or did they honestly believe that their luck would hold 11 and they would sell even more records? Or was it a timing problem: a commitment had been made to buy the pressing machines and right thereafter, information came (albeit too late) that radio broadcasting would take away a substantial portion of the record market?
It would be easy to answer such questions judging by the accounting and financial reporting standards of today, but they need to be studied within the framework of the 1920s. This means analyzing books on management accounting, newspaper articles, and other references from the 1920s in order to understand the perspectives then prevailing.
10 In 1987 Jazzology Records started to reissue some of the early recordings of the label on cd.
11 Recall that the highly successful vaudeville tour was still going on when the decision to buy the additional pressing machines was made.
Many modern accounting techniques were developed by engineers of American railroad companies in the 1850s and 1860s, and refined in the 20-30 years that followed (Chandler, 1977 12 ; Hoskin and Macve 1988 13 ). Although the standard double-entry bookkeeping systems remained in use, there were several major innovations in the financial, capital, and cost accounting fields. Within financial accounting, balance sheets assumed much greater importance than before and operating ratios were increasingly being used to assess managerial performance (such as the ratio of net earnings to total revenue or sales). In capital accounting, more attention was directed towards renewal accounting, in which both repairs and renewals were charged to operating expenses and not to capital or property accounts. This maintained the value of fixed assets at their original level, and tended to overstate operating costs. Within cost accounting, innovation was slower and did not really establish itself until in and around 1880 14 . Much effort was expended in building divisional accounts by means of acceptable and comparable unit cost measures. Some firms also constructed their own performance ratios such as the rate or velocity of inventory turnover and gross margin as a percentage of net sales. Wholesalers, large retailers and mail-order houses, which all became significant businesses as the nineteenth century progressed, used financial, capital and cost accounting methods and techniques that were very similar to those developed by the American railroads. The Pace Phonograph Corporation probably was no exception.
Although more and more specialized accounting measures came into use after 1850, accounting education was still in its infancy at the turn of the century. According to Chandler (1977) :
… both financial and cost accounting began to be taught extensively in colleges and universities. In 1900 accounting courses were given in only 12 institutions of higher learning, and these courses were little more than surveys of commercial bookkeeping. By 1910, 52 colleges and universities offered accounting courses, and by 1916 the number had risen to 116. By then, these courses included auditing, public accounting, and cost accounting. (p. 465)
Given the conditions of time in which he operated, it is highly unlikely that Harry Pace knew about the latest developments in accounting. Pace had been to university around 1900 but did not study accounting 15 . The entry of Negroes into university programs was very restricted so it is unlikely that any of Pace's staff had a strong academic accounting background or knowledge of the latest techniques either. (Allen 1973) , which indicates that he probably did little more than keeping the books for someone else to interpret. Parker (1969) states that, generally speaking, even by the 1920s, "The scorekeeper did not regard making decisions as part of his function" (p. 21). Taken together, this suggests that Haynes' role in the decision to buy the pressing machines may have been rather limited.
16 Annual reports and other financial data from a typical early twentieth century record company are not easy to find. Most were not required to publish or file accounts and a lot of data has been lost for a variety of reasons. For example, Calt (1988) Given that the company had presumably been started on $110,000 of borrowed capital 18 , Black Swan's reported 1921 surplus of $3,302 (approximately $3,600 annualized) is not very impressive. Thygesen, Berresford and Shor (1996) , using data from other sources, also obtain a 1921 profit figure of approximately $3,000 but, without providing any reason, think that the reported profit of $41,763 in a Chicago Defender newspaper article from April 1922 must be more accurate. The discrepancy in the reported profits could be due to the use of renewal accounting in the first case, and the absence of it in the latter. Renewal accounting overstates operating costs since capital costs are directly charged to the operating accounts, thus reducing total profits. The difference may also be due to the higher figure being earnings before interest and taxation. This is consistent with the difference between the capital stock of the company of $30,000 and the $110,000 funds borrowed by Pace to get the company started.
It is likely that the company used renewal accounting techniques but, as the company was new, little asset maintenance or replacement would have been charged in its first year. If we hold to the lower profit being net of all charges and the higher EBIT, we have a return on equity of 11%. If the difference of approximately $38,400 is for interest alone, it implies an interest rate of 40% on borrowed capital. However, if it also includes a charge for taxes, given that the company was a high-risk new venture by a black businessman, the debt-servicing estimate is probably reasonable.
Nevertheless, in Black Swan's first year of operation, it only earned a little over $3,300 to plough back into the business, repay borrowing, and provide a return for stockholders. Although 1922 was probably a more successful year as it would include the income from the vaudeville tour, the set-up costs of which must also have been included in the company's total cost figure of $101,327 for 1921, it is unlikely that the original capital of stock of $30,000 could have been repaid, let alone the total investment of $110,000. Cash had been spent on the unsuccessful 'Swanola' phonograph as well, the economic recession was becoming worse, and Black Swan was also declining for the non-financial reasons outlined in the previous Section of this paper.
We now move to a consideration of the decision to invest in the three additional pressing machines in mid-1922. Since the use of investment decision aides such as discounted cash flows, payback period, the internal rate of return, or the return on investment were not widespread in 1920 (Parker 1969 , Zimmerman 2000 19 , and because the use of renewal accounting may have given misleading information, Pace's 18 See footnote 5.
19 Yet, Parker (1969) says that an NPV-approach for evaluating financial investments was already advocated by Simon Stevin of Bruges in 1582! Knowledge of compound interest even goes as far back as the Old Babylonian Period (1800-1600 BC). However, although developments in capital theory were made especially by political economists like Fisher (1907) and his contemporaries, the use of net present value or other discounted cash flow methods was not common before the 1960s.
decision to buy the three additional press ing machines was possibly made in a rather 'ad-hoc' fashion 20 . Profits from the vaudeville tour were coming in and cash may have seemed plentiful so Pace probably just decided to go ahead and do it! Maybe Black Swan had hit a purple streak at last! From our personal observation, small firms still make decisions in a similar way today and, certainly for the early 1900s, it was not an untypical way to make an investment decision the way Harry Pace may have made it.
When the Black Swan Phonograph Corporation declared bankruptcy, its material was leased to Paramount and that company carried on reissuing the material under both its own and the Black Swan label until the market dried up (Rust 1978) . Perhaps Pace's problem then was not so much a lack of demand for black recordings or a wrong investment decision, but excessive overheads. That would be an interesting path to investigate but evidence to sustain or disprove this view seems unobtainable (certainly as Thygesen, Berresford and Shor 1996 could not find much financial information on Black Swan either, even after 15 years of research) 21 .
What Else Killed Black Swan?
A firm's production techniques and the nature of its production processes were generally not considered of primary importance to its long-term success. It was thought that profits could be enhanced by controlling competition and by managing securities (and the financial statements). In order to control competition, some industrial firms undertook vertical integration by the beginning of the twentieth century. According to Chandler (1977) :
The creation of distributing and marketing networks to provide … coordination, facilities and services caused the mass producers to internalize several processes of production and distribution and the market transactions between them within a single enterprise. … Such administrative coordination in turn created formidable barriers to entry. … Rival firms were rarely able to compete until they had built comparable marketing organizations of their own. (p. 364)
A major reason why Pace's company was initially successful was his stressing of the race issue and allowing Negroes to record in their own style, which the larger record companies simply refused to do until they saw Pace's success in this field. Pace's move to buy his own pressing plant in Long Island City (together with John Fletcher) instead of having all records pressed at the Wisconsin plant with which he had a contract, suggests that he also saw benefits in vertical integration (although this decision was also influenced by a demand and supply problem). Despite differences between record companies and typical industrial firms, the Black Swan case shows moves towards vertical integration and a desire to control competition in this business sector as well.
Vertically integrated firms could create more internally generated capital than others. Markets were thus increasingly dominated by a small number of large vertically integrated enterprises. The record business was not the typical industry group, yet a small number of companies (especially Victor, Columbia and OKeh) did dominate the market. Black Swan finally lost the battle against these competitors, which had better distribution and marketing networks and were able to raise large sums of money quickly (Pace's banking history suggests that he was no slouch in this regard either but his was a small business and his colour probably worked against him).
This leaves us with the question of the role of radio broadcasting in Black Swan's demise. Although commercial radio broadcasts began in late 1920, it was still in an experimental stage and the role of Negroes in its development was negligible (relatively few black people took up technical studies at that time). Performances by black musicians (mostly gospel singers) did not reach a mass audience until early 1922. As described in Section 2, Ethel Waters' path-breaking radio broadcast occurred in April 1922. Even a musician like Duke Ellington, already famous by the early 1920s, did not have his first radio performance until August 1923 (Halper 1999 ). Pace's decision to buy the pressing machines just before the explosion of radio broadcasting, of which he could have had limited knowledge at best, thus appears to have been an unfortunate coincidence rather than negligence.
However, although record companies generally blamed radio broadcasting for their decline in the 1920s and 1930s (Calt 1988) , the potential appeal of phonographs and records was constricted by their very high price in hard economic times already. Phonographs were essentially a luxury product, and customers mostly bought records just for the sake of operating their victrolas. Although phonographs could be bought for $100 (the 'Swanola' for example), quality players cost about $750 in the early 1920s. This represented 37% of average 1930 family income in the United States. Only one in ten families, black or white, had such an income. Record prices were standardized at 75¢ as the 1920s progressed, but had been much higher. Black Swan records were initially sold for $1, the equivalent of $12 mid-1990 American Dollars (Thygesen, Berresford and Shor 1996) . Furthermore, of nearly one thousand rural black Southern households surveyed in the mid-1930s, only 17.4% owned radios as opposed to 27.6% with victrolas. As radio stations rarely played black music, and featured no programming aimed at black audiences, it is unlikely that radios ever competed with recordings from companies like Black Swan as a black consumer item (Calt and Wardlow 1992) . The steep prices of both records and record players were the prime cause for the industry's fall during the Great Depression. Fierce competition for a small, and possibly diminishing, market rather than radio broadcasting is therefore considered a more likely explanation for the decline of record sales and record companies in the late 1920s and 1930s and the demise of Black Swan in particular.
Conclusions
There are many reasons why businesses may fail. General economic conditions may be harsh, they may be undercapitalized, books may have been tampered with to cover defalcation, or an unexpected and ruthless competitor may enter the market. In the case of the Pace Phonograph Corporation, in its heydays of 1921-1922 the most successful American Negro-owned business of its time, we have identified several key factors for its demise:
1. A bad investment decision was made halfway through 1922. The three additional pressing machines should never have been bought, even though the company had great difficulties handling all its orders at that time. Although management accounting methods and techniques were not as well-developed or widespread by the 1920s as they would become by the 1960s, and thus cannot have contributed much to the decision to buy the extra machines, it might have been clear that people would probably have waited for the additional orders since Harry Pace -at that moment-still operated the only company that had dived into a seemingly highly profitable market niche. However, it is likely that he just wanted to keep his customers satisfied in fear of orders being cancelled or losing clientele, which makes the decision to buy the machines more comprehensible 22 .
The fact that radio broadcasting would take away a substantial part of the record market probably could not have been anticipated, and when it was, the decision to buy the pressing machines had already been made. The company's management therefore cannot be held culpable for this factor in explaining the decline of the Black Swan, a factor that is arguable at best.
22 Nearly eighty years later, sophisticated businesses were making the same mistakes. Air New Zealand purchased the remaining 50% share of Ansett Australia which it did not already own in order to maintain its market in Australia and internationally. However, it was in such a hurry to buy the airline before competitors did that it failed to carry out adequate due diligence. Consequently, the true state of the Ansett fiancés only became know after the purchase and Air New Zealand finally had to admit defeat and hand Ansett over to the administrators. Coupled with the sharp decline in the airline industry following the September 11 th 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the losses sustained at Ansett very nearly brought down Air New Zealand as well.
Although they may not have altered Pace's decision to invest in new machinery, management accounting techniques may have helped in detecting unduly high overheads, another possible cause of the company's failure.
2.
The larger record companies were better equipped to reach the mass market more quickly than the Pace Phonograph Corporation. As soon as they saw Pace's success, they started copying his ideas, ultimately driving him out of his own niche market -an occurrence not unknown in today's market place.
3. Finally, the role cultural elements played in the Black Swan case is extremely important and may be the strongest explanation of both the company's rapid rise and its even faster fall. Pace ran a Negro-owned business (at least until John Fletcher joined in), and had to deal with prejudice, oppression, and limited access to capital on a far greater scale than white persons in a similar situation. Not only were Negroes taken advantage of by club owners and band leaders, they were also discriminated against by publishers, distributors, financiers and other people in the music business. Pace's idea of starting a completely black-owned and operated business thus was a bold one, yet it appealed to the needs of a large section of the American people, which led to the company's initial big boom. A dream seemed to come true.
In the end however, the race issue worked against Pace. It became known that he issued records by white musicians implying that blacks had recorded them, a move unworthy of Pace 23 . Perhaps this deception was spurred on by the heat of the moment, in a vain attempt to appeal to white people in order to make at least some money and to regain some of Black Swan's lost market share (albeit in a different segment of the market) as more labels started to make Negro recordings 24 . The start of the decline in the company's fortunes that occurred by the end of 1922 25 can be identified with the change in recording policy. It may thus be another key point in explaining why Black Swan failed so quickly. Within the African-American community, the company's recording hoax caused a lot of bad blood and, since Pace's alliance with John Fletcher already made it appear as if he had broken his promise to build an entirely Negro-owned record corporation, the company was deserted more and more by artists and customers alike. These effects were too powerful to correct, even for a man of Pace's experience and fame as a rebuilder of falling enterprises.
Yet, whatever may have happened, we should never forget that Harry Pace had a dream, a dream to build the first all-Negro record company and to establish it firmly on the recording map. Given that he had to cope with excess orders virtually every day this must have soon seemed like a dream to come true. It makes many of his decisions all the more understandable -even if he did have foreknowledge of the rise of radio broadcasting (both the knowledge and influence of which can be challenged), even if he was blinded by his own success, even if overheads were too high, and even if he knew he was doing things that might affect the company's reputation. Despite the demise of the Black Swan label, Pace's vision was picked up by the larger record companies and thus, we can still see his influence on the recording industry today. We might even claim that the record business would not have been the same if it had not been for Harry Pace.
references to it are from early 1923 or later. Probably Henderson's original recording was stored and remained unissued until a year later since Black Swan 2079 was recorded in July/August 1922 and Black Swan 2116 (on which Henderson both participated) dates from February 1923 (Allen 1973) . The start of the 2100 run must therefore lie somewhere in between, as Thygesen, Berresford and Shor (1996) also indicate. We may thus assume that as total falsifications expanded when Black Swan's demise began, the company may indeed have initiated an elaborate, but vain attempt to appeal to white people, which finally worked against it.
